Top all-time · #24890
Islo
Company blog · islo.dev/blogaiprogramming
Islo is the company blog at islo.dev, writing about ai and programming. Since 2026, 3 different Hacker News readers have linked it 5 times. It is still writing: the last post was on 2026-10-22, and you can follow it by feed.
Too few sampled comments (3) to say how often HN recommends it.?
Why HN links it
Linked as a company product: zero-setup microVM sandboxes for AI coding agents, with isolated networking, credential proxies and a human approval workflow. The comments do not assess any writing.
Summarised by Claude from a sample of 3 HN comments that link here. Each comment is marked recommending, critical or neutral (citing without judging); how this works.
Islo deploys and runs autonomous coding agents in secure environments connected to your tools, so they can finish real engineering work.
What Hacker News says?
Kudos! Cool idea, I'm on the same path you are, yet you're just one step ahead. For mouse.dev, what are you using for the cloud agent sandbox piece? I haven't moved my agents to the cloud yet (for on the go mobile enablement). Would Islo be a competitor to mouse? https://islo.dev/ https://www.incredibuild.com/blog/why-we-built-islo-ai-codin...
Comment linking /
on “DeepClaude – Claude Code agent loop with DeepSeek V4 Pro, 17x cheaper”Submitted How we stopped working for our agents: when software factory DOESN'T work as a story · 2 points
HN discussionWe've been working on exactly this at Islo. Zero-setup microVM sandboxes with isolated networking by default, plus an approval workflow layer so agents can request capabilities and humans approve/deny in real-time. The credential problem is handled through proxy middleware - agents never see real tokens, requests get routed through policy-checked proxies that inject credentials only for approved operations. Happy to…
Comment linking /
on “Let's Discuss Sandbox Isolation”Submitted Monty and Islo: Sandbox the Snippet, Isolate the Agent as a story · 1 points
HN discussionThe pattern only works if the tool enforces the OTP - i.e. the CLI doesn't perform the dangerous action until it receives the OTP through a path the agent can't spoof. If the tool just returns "ask the user for OTP" and the agent relays that to the user and then passes whatever the user types back into the tool, the security is in the tool's implementation: it must verify the OTP (e.g. server-side or via a channel t…
Comment linking /
on “Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents”