Top all-time · #15835
Rok Garbas
Personal blog · garbas.siprogrammingsystems
Rok Garbas's personal blog at garbas.si covers programming and systems. Since 2015, 5 different Hacker News readers have linked it 5 times, most often “Reproducible development environments with NIX”. It is still writing: the last post was on 2026-04-15, and you can follow it by feed.
Too few sampled comments (3) to say how often HN recommends it.?
Why HN links it
HN commenters cite its posts on reproducible builds for NixOS, including a summit report and reproducible development environments with pinned nixpkgs. The posts are linked as sources in Nix discussions.
Summarised by Claude from a sample of 3 HN comments that link here. Each comment is marked recommending, critical or neutral (citing without judging); how this works.
20+ years DevOps/SRE/Release Engineering. Mozilla, Tweag, Flox. Technical enough to build, human enough to explain.
Most-linked posts?
- /2016/reproducible-builds-summit-in-berlin.html2 people · 2 mentions · first linked 2016-12-22
- Reproducible development environments with NIX2 people · 2 mentions · first linked 2015-09-10
What Hacker News says?
`nix-build` can take `--check` to do a similar thing. However, not all packages are reproducible. We've been doing a bit of work on this: https://garbas.si/2016/reproducible-builds-summit-in-berlin.... and have begun checking reproducibility in our CI system: http://hydra.nixos.org/jobset/nixos/reproducibility
Comment linking /2016/reproducible-builds-summit-in-berlin.html
on “Distributing NixOS with IPFS”Submitted Building App Container Images with Nix as a story · 1 points
HN discussionFor your last point, you don't have to use the channels (which will anyway be deprecated at some point iirc), and you can pin the nixpkgs version in your nix files (like it is done in https://garbas.si/2015/reproducible-development-environments... )
Comment linking /2015/reproducible-development-environments.html
on “Typing Nix”Submitted Reproducible development environments with NIX as a story · 1 points
HN discussionMost isn't enough. "All?" with a question mark isn't enough. Just like one zero-day is enough to totally compromise a system, one unverified source anywhere in a build dependency tree is a great way to land just one RCE, leaving your system precisely as hosed as if you just got hit with a zero-day. :) I saw another blog about the summit the top link reports on discuss this as well -- from https://garbas.si/2016/repr…
Comment linking /2016/reproducible-builds-summit-in-berlin.html
on “How to make Linux more trustworthy”