Work in progress: 181,232 of 181,233 sites checked so far, more every week · updated 2 Nov 2026Missing a blog? Tell us

Top all-time · #6396

L

luiscardoso.dev

Personal blog · luiscardoso.dev/blogaisecurityprogramming

luiscardoso.dev is a personal blog at luiscardoso.dev about ai, security and programming. Since 2026, 13 different Hacker News readers have linked it 14 times, most often “A field guide to sandboxes for AI”. No feed was found, so read it on the site itself.

No feed foundVisit the blog
14mentions?
13HN people?
2026–2026first – last linked?

Too few sampled comments (5) to say how often HN recommends it.?

Why HN links it

HN readers link Luis Cardoso's posts on sandboxing for AI agents, including a field guide covering threat models and containers versus host kernels, and recommend them as reading.

Summarised by Claude from a sample of 5 HN comments that link here. Each comment is marked recommending, critical or neutral (citing without judging); how this works.

Most-linked posts?

  1. A field guide to sandboxes for AI
    12 people · 13 mentions · first linked 2026-01-05

What Hacker News says?

  1. Agreed, sandboxing is only part of agent security. Authorization (what data the agent can access and what tools it can execute) is also a big part of it. I've found primer on agent sandboxes [0] is a great reference on sandboxing options and the trade-offs For agents there's a tension between level of restriction and utility. I think a large part of OpenClaw's popularity is that the lack of restriction by default ha…

    Comment linking /blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    on “NanoClaw solves one of OpenClaw's biggest security issues”
  2. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  3. See: A field guide to sandboxes for AI¹ on the threat models. > I want to be direct: containers are not a sufficient security boundary for hostile code. They can be hardened, and that matters. But they still share the host kernel. The failure modes I see most often are misconfiguration and kernel/runtime bugs — plus a third one that shows up in AI systems: policy leakage. ¹ https://www.luiscardoso.dev/blog/sandboxes…

    Comment linking /blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    on “Show HN: yolo-cage – AI coding agents that can't exfiltrate secrets”
  4. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  5. vrn21 · 2026-01-28Recommends
    Luis wrote an excellent blog about it btw: https://www.luiscardoso.dev/blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    Comment linking /blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    on “Show HN: I Built a Sandbox for Agents”
  6. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  7. sea-gold · 2026-01-14Recommends
    This was also a great read: https://www.luiscardoso.dev/blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    Comment linking /blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    on “A deep dive on agent sandboxes”
  8. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  9. See: A field guide to sandboxes for AI¹ on the threat models. > I want to be direct: containers are not a sufficient security boundary for hostile code. They can be hardened, and that matters. But they still share the host kernel. The failure modes I see most often are misconfiguration and kernel/runtime bugs — plus a third one that shows up in AI systems: policy leakage. ¹ https://www.luiscardoso.dev/blog/sandboxes…

    Comment linking /blog/sandboxes-for-ai

    on “Fly's Sprites.dev addresses dev environment sandboxes and API sandboxes together”
  10. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  11. Submitted A field guide to sandboxing AI workloads as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  12. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  13. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion
  14. Submitted A field guide to sandboxes for AI as a story · 1 points

    HN discussion

Search all of HN for luiscardoso.dev

Linked by the same people?